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Abstract 
The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and 
political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among 
government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the GMM (1991) and 
GMM system (1998), using a country-level panel data from 112 countries for the period 1997 to 
2010. The main results show that political stability is not the key for the tax policy, under the 
control of political regime durability the taxes as percent in GDP having consistent sinusoidal 
tendency, by cubic type. 
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1. Introduction  
 
There is no doubt that any change in political area has strong implications in the socio-
economical systems. Bussiere and Multer (2000) see the political instability trough some factors, 
such as: the political polarization in the parliament; the coalition governments; the undecided 
voters and fickleness of the voters; and the control and timing of the elections. As Hendry (2001) 
notes, the changes in legislation, with sudden modify of economic policy and severe political 
turmoil, cause large “shocks or\breaks” in the economy. 
Both the stability and instability can have different manifestations of civil wars or violent 
conflicts, democratic setbacks, few guarantees for human rights groups, violation of trade unions, 
massacres, forced displacement, violent little state presence in regional geography. Reports of 
Freedon House (1972 to 2011) show that these are factors that have greater relevance to the 
future. Even in the wide area of Eastern Europe, some Latin American countries, regimes are 
semi-consolidated authoritarian. 
According to Weingast (2009), changes in these old regimes are transformations that affect 
the political institutions, involving sudden changes in the central, replacement and emergency 
powers of local governments, in some cases radical authoritarian and undemocratic. A majority 
of adverse changes in these regimes tend to favour some democracies and, conversely, promote 
authoritarianism. The scale of transformation in the countries that were under the government of 
the Soviet Union is an example of this. The same happens in other regions when the central 
authority collapsed state, as in the cases of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
during the 1990s, the overthrow of the radical revolution in Cuba in 1959 in Iran in 1979, the 
dissolution of the Confederate States, or demands for secession of the state by extrajudicial 
means, as happened in the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1991, Pakistan in 1972. Venezuela is a case 
of unstable political system, whose systems of government evolved from a political party system 
with an excessive concentration of power to an authoritarian government run by one person. 
Kalyvas (2006) considers that the political instability may relate to violent conflicts of low 
intensity. Types of government coalitions with paramilitary groups in rural areas, displacing 
people and expropriate land from its owners. For Estrada (2010) levels of violence vary from 
massacres against the opposition political groups to assassinations of presidential candidates as in 
Colombia during the late 90s. No need to use extreme violence, a political regime can sacrifice 
union leaders or opposition parties. In paramilitary massacres objectives can be derived from 
regional struggles over land, in other cases by animosities against opportunism and conflicts 
within a community. Colombia and Rwanda, in opinion of Kalyvas (2006), are an appropriate 
example of these manifestations of political instability, military regimes in Latin America during 
the 80 years separating the enemies of the opposition, condemning their people and their 
households. In Central America the violent conflict committed against the civilian population 
became an authoritarian regime by a revolutionary government, but its development was a 
continuation of extreme violence by paramilitary groups against specific groups of civilians. 
Social movements can lead to revolutionary changes such as Egypt, bloodless extraordinary. 
The transition does not mean a leap toward democracy but toward hybrid forms of government. 
However, massacres, assassinations and forced displacement almost always directly affect the 
political stability of a country. Furthermore, political instability promotes a fragmented image of 
internal conflicts, separate different actions of organized violence, insurgent struggle, forced 
displacement and violence. The challenge is to unify these manifestations of civil violence in the 
formation of a complex domain of political instability. When many events overlap as in the case 
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of countries in Africa and Latin America, we detect relationships among the first acts of violence 
and the terminal stage of it. 
There are some researches that see the political factors in significant connection with the tax 
level. Melo (2011), for example, identifies many taxation determinants: the levels of economic 
development and GDP per capita, the tax handles, the tax morale, and the political regimes.  
Even if the literature is relatively poor regarding the relationship between tax level and 
political stability, there are two main different directions regarding the results of this connection: 
(a) the level of taxation determines the political stability (Feng, 1997; Devereux and Wen, 1998; 
Bell, 2001; Palan, 2002; Carmignani, 2003; Collier, 2009a, 2009b; Ghura and Mercereau, 2004; 
Nkurunziza, 2005; Elgin, 2010; and Estrada, 2011); and b) the political stability determines the 
level of taxation (Cukierman et al., 1992; Volkerink and De Haan, 1999; Bohn, 2002; Aizenmana 
and Jinjarak, 2008; Azzimonti, 2010; Melo, 2011; and Rieth, 2011). 
In this paper we use the GMM estimates (1991) and GMM system estimates (1998) in order 
to avoid the endogenity issue associated with tax. We consider a country panel-data from 112 
countries (Table A1, in Appendix), for the period 1997 to 2010, to study the dynamic relationship 
between taxes as percent in GDP (Tax) and political stability (PS). Our main interest is to study 
whether the dynamics of tax revenue are different across countries with different levels of 
political stability. Further, to analyse the issue in a comprehensive manner we analysed non-
linearity associated with political stability. Finally, we analysed the relationship between Tax and 
PS by using some economic control variables (as Table A2 in Appendix shows, the variables 
used are Government effectiveness, hereafter GE; Freedom of corruption, hereafter FC; Gross 
Domestic Product, hereafter GDP).  
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of literature; Section 3 
presents the empirical specification and the data description; Section 4 provides the results of our 
work; and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The literature in the field of the relationship between tax level and political stability are 
relatively poor. On the one hand, there are authors who claim that the level of taxation determines 
the political stability, but on the other hand, others researchers state that the political stability 
determines the level of taxation.   
The level of taxation determines the political stability. For Feng (1997) and Bell (2001) 
the political stability is the consequence of a strong taxation power that cares about the quality of 
life of people. Devereux and Wen (1998) start their research based on the connection between 
economic growth and size of government, and political instability respectively. Some of the 
results allow that the high tax of capital is associated with political instability. Analysing the 
issue of tax heaven, Palan (2002) find that the most successful tax havens have political and 
economic stability. 
One year after, Carmignani (2003) explores the models in which the political instability 
affects several economic variables, such are: economic growth, budget formation, inflation, and 
monetary policy. He does not forget the taxation issue. His main results show that an increase in 
capital taxation for redistributive purposes reduces the investments in the legal system, 
determines policy myopia induced by political instability and uncertainty.  
Ghura and Mercereau (2004) focus the study on Central African Republic. They analyse the 
relationship between trade and taxation, on the one hand, and political climate, on the other hand. 
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Using an econometrical investigation instrument, they find that the turbulences in the level of 
trade and low tax revenues could generate chances of political environment; more precisely these 
factors can propagate political instability.  
Nkurunziza (2005) treats both high tax rates and political instability. The main results of his 
investigation stress that during a period of economic meltdown high tax rates and political 
instability force the taxpayers to go in underground economy or to leave the government taxation 
system. Collier (2009a, 2009b) provides quantitative arguments to assess the causes of political 
instability. His hypothesis is that economic opportunities are the main causes of civil wars. In 
some cases, as Estrada (2011) shows that the political instability depends on a weak state 
presence in the territories and the power of guerrilla insurgents. In most countries depend mainly 
on the fiscal challenges of hybrid between the stability conditions and political instability. 
Finally, Elgin (2010) demonstrates the hypothesis that confirms the connection between tax 
level and political stability. The author’s model involves that countries in which the political 
turnover is high, the level of tax burden is low. 
The political stability determines the level of taxation. Cukierman et al. (1992) study the 
issue of tax reform. The tested model used cross-sectional data for 79 countries. Based on the 
main results, the authors consider that countries with a more unstable and polizared political 
system have an inefficient tax structure. Moreover, the political instability is positively connected 
with the seigniorage.  
Volkerink and De-Haan (1999), applying panel data analysis on a large sample of OECD 
countries for the period 1965-1995, investigate the relationship between tax structure and 
political climate. He found that the political and institutional variables do not have any significant 
impact on the shape of the tax structure. The other part of analysis shows that an unstable regime 
has a higher tax burden. For Bohn (2002), the political instability causes myopic government 
behaviour and high debt levels, but it does not lead to an increase in inflation taxation, as in 
Cukierman, et al. (1992) has sustained. 
Aizenmana and Jinjarak (2008) focused on the efficiency of tax collection in their study and 
found that the efficiency of tax collection is affected by the greater polarization and political 
instability. More precisely, the reduced political stability determines a low efficiency of tax 
collection. Azzimonti (2010) explored the effect of political instability. The author emphasised 
that a rise in the level of political instability generate an decrease of the level of resources (i.e., 
taxes) available to next period’s policymaker, restricting in this way the spending of local public 
good. Melo (2011) studied the connection “tax level - political stability” in the case of Argentina, 
using “transaction cost politics” and Brasilia for comparison. He concludes that an explaining for 
low taxation in Argentina is political instability. In this case, the systemic political instability 
affects the tax behaviour of governments. 
Rieth (2011) considers the hypothesis that higher political instability leads to an increase of 
the tax rate on capital income. The author tested this idea using a panel approach, with annual 
observations for 13 OECDies, for the period 1964-1983. The main finding shows that an increase 
of the index of political instability determines an increase of the tax rate on capital. 
A simplified Figure 1 can show the variation between taxation and political stability. The full 
table identifies four types of political stability related to four types of taxation. This likewise 
reduces the space of four types of analysis to political stability: without political stability but low 
tax (for example Somalia and Congo-Kinshasa), without stability but high tax (Kazakhstan, Iran, 
and Colombia), with political stability and high tax (Norway, Japan), and with political stability 
but low tax (Jamaica, Belgium).  
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Figure 1: The variation between taxation and political stability 
 
Tax 
Without PS and high Tax With PS and high Tax 
Without PS and low Tax With PS and low Tax 
Variables Political Stability 
 
 
The location in any of the four quadrants makes a powerful difference to the character of the 
prosecutor and the public policy of a political regime. The conditions correspond to forms of 
taxation prevailing in each quadrant: (1) Without stability with high taxation - with conditioning 
of civil liberties, public opinion subordinate large budget for state military forces, the regime 
changes depend on conflicts between élite or a rebellion from below; (2) Without stability, low 
taxation - the state has no presence throughout the country, paramilitary groups occupy 
peripheral areas of the country, fighting between insurgent groups and displacement of civilians, 
many paramilitaries organizations are vying for political power in the localities; (3) With stability 
and high taxation - the civil liberties permanent social mobility, the difference between political 
parties, respect union rights, democratic opposition and competitive elections, control of private 
expressions of violence, low levels of political violence; and (4) With stability and low taxation - 
similar to regimes with high capacity and stability of taxation, social movements, frequent 
mobilization of political parties, formal consultations (including elections), but low effectiveness 
of tax control and greater involvement of actors in public policy illegal, deadly violence selective 
and high crimes. 
The literature regarding the connection between tax level and political stability allows that 
there are two directions of the relationship: “tax level first and political stability second” (the 
level of taxation determines the political stability), and “the political stability first and tax level 
second” (the political stability determines the level of taxation). Whatever is the direction of these 
connections; the considered variables can have the same sign or a different one. Moreover, even 
if operate such investigations, there are few of them that treat this connection under some 
economic or non-economic factors.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The usual way of analysis in panel data models is use of static panel data models in the 
framework of either one way fixed/random effect models or two way fixed/random effects 
model. However, it is important to mention that static panel (with or without fixed and random 
6 
 
effects) models do not allow us to analyze the possible dynamism existing in country tax 
determinants. Most of the tax regression studies assume that tax is an exogenous variable, even 
though tax is expected to be endogenous in tax regressions. In addition to that, tax may present 
issues of reverse causality for example, if PS depends on the level of taxation, it will necessarily 
depend on tax, and if this kind of reverse causality is not taken into account, it can lead to serious 
inaccuracies in research results. In such a situation, it is not only that the parameter estimates will 
be inconsistent (because error term of the tax equation may include factors that both affect tax 
and are correlated with PS) but also the magnitude and the meaning of the PS parameter will be 
altered as well. Therefore, we employed dynamic panel data estimation techniques to deal with 
the issue of endogenity in the context of panel data models. For such analysis, we relied on 
Arellano and Bond’s Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) - type estimator (1991) in our 
analysis. In the dynamic framework, we can specify our equation as follows: 
 
,)()()()()( 1,43210 ittiititititit wTaxGEFCPSYTax                   (1) 
 
with itiitw   , where β0,1,2… the regression coefficients, i indexes countries, t indexes time, 
itw represents both country effects )( i  and the remainder error term which varies over both 
country and time )( it . The GMM-type estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is also 
known as two-step estimation process and are constructed in two phases. Firstly, first differences 
from the dynamic panel data model are calculated; then, lagged levels of right-hand side variables 
are used as their instruments. With a lagged dependent variable and other endogenous regressors, 
the lagged levels are dated t-2 and earlier (t indexes time). If there are predetermined regressors, 
all their lagged levels are used as instruments. Evaluation of the equation (1) in first differences 
allows us to eliminate unobservable individual effects, eliminating in this way the correlation 
between i  and Taxi, t-1. The use of lags of the tax and its determinants as instruments allows for 
the creation of orthogonal conditions between it and Taxi, t-1 i.e., eliminating correlation between 
it and Taxi, t-1. 
However, Blundell and Bond (1998) concluded
1
 that when the dependent variable is 
persistent i.e., there being a high correlation between its values in the current period and in the 
previous period, and the number of periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is 
inefficient. For this kind of situations Blundell and Bond (1998) have extend the GMM (1991) 
estimator by considering a system with variables at level and first differences. For the variables at 
level in equation (1), the instruments are the variables lagged in first differences. In the case of 
                                                          
1
 Arellano and Bond (1991) have derived a consistent generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator for the 
model in which the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the lagged dependent variables and making 
standard estimators inconsistent. However, the Arellano and Bond estimator can perform poorly if the autoregressive 
parameters are too large or the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance of idiosyncratic error is 
too large. Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system 
estimator that uses additional moment conditions. This estimator is designed for datasets with many panels and few 
periods. This method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and requires the initial 
condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with the first difference of the first observation of the dependent 
variable. 
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the variables in first differences in equation (1), the instruments are those lagged variables at 
level. However, the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators can only be 
considered robust if, firstly the restrictions created as a consequence of using GMM (1991) and 
GMM (1998) are valid and secondly, there is no evidence of second order autocorrelation. To test 
the validity of the restrictions we use the Sargan test in the case of the GMM (1991) and GMM 
(1998) estimator. In both cases, the null hypothesis is the restrictions imposed by use of the 
instruments are valid against the alternative hypothesis that the restrictions are not valid. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, we can infer that the estimators are not robust since restrictions 
imposed by use of instrument are not valid. Moreover, to test for the existence of first and second 
order autocorrelation we use Arellano and Bond (1991) test. The null hypothesis is that there is 
no autocorrelation of first and second order against the alternative hypothesis being the existence 
of autocorrelation. And if the null hypothesis of non-existence of second order autocorrelation is 
rejected we conclude that the estimators are not robust. 
Further, unlike other studies, the empirical model, which we have estimated, is of the 
following form: 
 
ittiititititititit wTaxGEFCPSPSPSYTax   )()()()()()()( 1,65
3
4
2
3210   .       (2) 
 
This is to incorporate nonlinearities in tax - political stability relationship.  
 
4. Estimation and Empirical Results 
 
Before conducting regression analysis, correlation analysis was carried out in order to find 
out whether there is any evidence of severe multicollinearity among the test variables, as in the 
presence of severe multicollinearity the analysis may provide misleading conclusions (Table A3 
in Appendix). Since we do not find evidence of severe multicollinearity, regression analysis has 
been carried out with incorporation of all variables simultaneously (Tables A4 in Appendix).  
We present the results of the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators for 
different alternative models in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Results of Dynamic panel data analysis  
 
Panel data Models: Dependent variable is Tax; standard error in parenthesis  
Independent 
variables 
Model 1: 
GMM (1991) 
Model 1: 
GMM (1998) 
Model 2: 
GMM (1991) 
Model 2: 
GMM (1998) 
Model 3: 
GMM (1991) 
Model 3: 
GMM (1998) 
Tax (-1) 
.4992216 
a
 
(.0001156) 
.3243175
 a
 
(.0000733) 
.498954
 a
 
(.0001244) 
.325414
a
 
(.000065) 
.4989525
 a
 
(.0001271) 
.3291352
 a
 
(.0001126) 
GDP 
4.59e-08
 a
 
(4.57e-09) 
-3.99e-08
 a
 
(2.76e-09) 
3.43e-08
 a
 
(6.71e-09) 
-1.65e-08
 a
 
(4.23e-09) 
3.86e-08
 a
 
(8.71e-09) 
1.77e-07
 a
 
(7.55e-09) 
PS 
-.0021769
 a
 
(.0000514) 
-.0011506
 a
 
(.0000242) 
-.0044604
 a
 
(.0001507) 
.0041391
 a
 
(.0001299) 
-.0050773
 a
 
(.0002558) 
-.0204022
 a
 
(.0004208) 
(PS)×(PS) 
--- --- .0000326
 a
 
(3.57e-06) 
-.0000718
 a
 
(3.69e-06) 
.0000555
 a
 
(8.22e-06) 
.0006167
 a
 
(.0000155) 
(PS)×(PS) ×(PS) 
--- --- 
---- --- 
-1.61e-07
b
 
(5.52e-08) 
-3.97e-06
 a
 
(1.56e-07) 
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FC 
.0083895
 a
  
(.0000162) 
.0071822
 a
 
(8.73e-06) 
.0084384
 a
 
(.0000153) 
.0074015
 a
 
(9.35e-06) 
.0084545
 a
 
(.0000156) 
.0087408
 a
 
(.0000115) 
GE 
.0118038
 a
 
(.0004304) 
-.0832372
 a
 
(.0002067) 
.0135756
 a
 
(.0004237) 
-.0647443
 a
 
(.0001812) 
.0139
 a
 
(.0004345) 
-.0903397
 a
 
(.0002986) 
Constant 
-.1726804
 a
 
(.0064904) 
-.0369847
 a
 
(.0004197) 
-.1699871
 a
 
(.0095052) 
-.0757084
 a
 
(.0013674) 
-.1668547
 a
 
(.0094277) 
-.0185289
 a
 
(.0038473) 
Model summary    
Abond test 
Z1= -1.0054   
Z2= -.21261  
Z1= -1.0059 
Z2= -.20837 
Z1= -1.0055 
Z2= -.18572 
Z1=-1.0058 
Z2=-.26396 
Z1= -1.0055 
Z2= -.19049 
Z1=-1.003 
Z2=.63707 
Sargan test 
chi
2
(90)= 
99.477 
chi
2
(103)= 
105.68 
chi
2
(90)= 
98.4789 
chi
2
(103)= 
105.6927 
chi
2
(90)= 
98.1957 
chi
2
(103)= 
101.8818 
Wald chi
2
 2.29e+07
a
 3.73e+07
a
 1.96e+07
a
 3.86e+07
a
 2.02e+07
a
 1.62e+07
a
 
Country included 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Total observations 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 1568 
Note: 1. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of 
the explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory 
variables.  
2. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, 
against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used.  
3. The Z1 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, 
against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first order autocorrelation.  
4. The Z2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation 
against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation.  
5. 
a
 and 
b
 denote significance at 1 and 5 % level of significance.  
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
We analyzed three models. In the model our regression equation includes Tax(-1), GDP, PS, 
FC and GE as independent variables. However, in the second and third model respectively square 
of PS cube of PS is included as additional variables. The results of the Wald test in all the three 
models for GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) cases show that the determinants used in this study 
can be considered, as a whole, explanatory of the economic growth, as Wald test is significant at 
1% level of significance. Further, as the Sargan test is not significant in all models therefore, we 
can conclude that data do not provide evidence to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity 
and consequent restrictions generated from use of the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) 
dynamic estimators respectively. This implies that the instruments and restrictions generated 
from the use of GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) are valid. Arellano and Bond (1991) (indicated 
by Abond test) test of autocorrelation shows that in all models data do not provide evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis of the absence of first and second order autocorrelation. Therefore, 
given the validity of the instruments and restriction imposed by GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) 
and absence of first and second order autocorrelation, we can conclude that the GMM (1991) and 
GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators are efficient and robust.  
The presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors is a major drawback when 
using least squares, because it renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. Even so, this 
estimation method proceeds by essentially treating the variables included in the regression as 
exogenous and the country-specific effects as homogeneous among different individuals. If these 
assumptions do hold, there should be no substantial differences between the OLS and the GMM 
results. However, we find this is not so when we applied OLS model by including lagged 
dependent variables with other regressors. When OLS is applied only lagged tax variable is 
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significant in all the three models and all other variables are insignificant. Further, we also find 
insignificance of the all variables when OLS model with fixed and random effect (results are not 
reported but results are accessible from authors) is used implying presence of sever issue of 
endogenity.  
It is evident from Table 1 that lagged tax is significant with positive sign in all models either 
we apply GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998). In case of model 1, GMM (1991) provide 
evidence of GDP being positively significance however, GMM system (1998) show that GDP is 
negatively significance. Similar, holds for model 2 however, in case of model 3 both GMM 
(1991) and GMM system (1998) provide evidence that GDP is positive and statistically 
significant, which corresponds to the theory. Therefore, we can rely on model 3. Further, PS is 
negatively significant in all three models with the use of both estimators (except in model 2 with 
the use of GMM system (1998) estimators). Square of PS is significant with positive sign in 
model 3 with both estimators. It also holds for model 2 with the application of GMM (1991) 
estimators, whereas when GMM system (1998) is applied square of PS become significant with 
negative sign. Interestingly, cube of PS is negatively significant with the application both 
estimators that GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998). Further, our evidence shows that FC is 
positively significant in all models with the application of both estimators. Finally, we find 
surprising results for GE. That is when GMM (1991) estimator is used in the all three model GF 
is positive and significant however, when GMM system (1998) is used we find that GE is still 
significant in all the three models but with negative sign. Constant term in all cases is also found 
to significant but with negative sign.  
Based on the coefficients of model 3, Tax function in respect to PS has a trend as Figure 2 
illustrates. We note that: 
 
)(0,)(0,:Tax                                                              (3) 
 
In this case, the cubic Tax function in respect to PS has fluctuated tendency, with two critical 
points: one minimum (PSmin.) and another maximum (PSmax.). PS1a and PS1b are the roots of first 
derivative cubic function Tax in respect to PS, and PS2 is the root for the second derivative of the 
same function. 
 
Figure 2: The tendency of cubic Tax function in respect to PS 
 
PS 0 PS1a  PS2  PS1b + 
f’(PS) -------------- 0 +++++++++++++++++++ 0 -------------- 
f”(PS) +++++++++++++++++++++ 0 -------------------------------------- 
Trend of f(PS) Decrease PSmin. Increase PSmax. Decrease 
Form of function 
 
PSinf. 
 
 
On the function’s definition interval (0, +∞), Tax cubic function in respect to PS decreases to 
PS1a, increases between two critical points (PS1a, PS1b), and decreases from PS1b. More, there is 
an inflection point PSinf. in which accelerated increasing trend becomes slowed.     
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5. Conclusions  
 
The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between Tax and PS by 
using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among the GE, FC and GDP. 
For the purpose, we used the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) in order to avoid the 
endogenity issue associated with tax. For analysis, we used country-level panel-data from 112 
countries for the period 1997 to 2010.  
The salient features of the model are: (a) simplicity, even if there are complex nonlinear 
interactions effects by cubic type; (b) accuracy and low level of errors, because the model 
achieves a high percentage of accuracy in distinguishing countries with inclination to political 
instability, compared to countries with political stability; (c) generality, because there is a 
extended panel-data with 112 countries, and (d) novelty, because the model incorporates a 
nonlinear tool and generates new results that helps and extend the conventional literature.  
Study finds that significant positive response of tax to tax in all cases. Response of tax to 
GDP is varies with the estimators we use however, for our preferred model GDP shows positive 
impact on tax. The very interesting findings of our study is that low level of PS and very high 
level of PS (indicated by cube of PS) show negative impact on tax whereas medium level of PS 
(square of PS) show positive impact on tax. Effect of FC (freedom from corruption) is positive on 
tax revenue as we expected and as far as effect of government effectiveness is concerned we are 
unable to draw a solid conclusion. This is because sign of the coefficient associated with GE is 
changing as we change the use of estimators.  
A long period of political stability determines a decrease of taxes as percent in GDP in the 
first years. This could be the results of expansionary tax policy as political voters “reward” in the 
first years of governance. After that, comes a long political contractionary period, characterised 
by high taxes and high level of taxation in GDP. This is for political power a political 
“permissive” period, based on government democratic credibility or autocratic abuse. Finally, as 
the period of political stability increases continuously, the level of taxation decreases. This last 
period is related to “populism” period, with low taxes and high government financial transfers.   
Regarding policy implication, as the results shows, the political stability is not the key for the 
tax policy, under the control of political regime durability the taxes as percent in GDP having 
consistent sinusoidal tendency, by cubic type. In respect to political regime durability, a low level 
of taxation as percent in GDP could be applied only on short and long term. Otherwise, high 
taxation level is equivalent to medium political regime durability.      
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Variables and their sources 
 
Variable Source 
Tax - Taxes in GDP (%) 
World Bank online data-set, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) from 1960 to 2010 
PS - Political stability (years) 
Polity™ IV Project Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2009 Dataset 
GE - Government effectiveness 
(2.5 maxim quality points) 
World Bank online data-set, Aggregate Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2009 
FC - Freedom of corruption  
(100 - no corruption) 
The Heritage Foundation 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product in 
US Dollars 
World Bank online data-set, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) from 1960 to 2010 
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Table A2: List of analyzed countries 
 
Countries 
Albania Costa Rica Indonesia  Mongolia   Slovenia 
Algeria Croatia Iran, I.R. of Morocco South Africa         
Angola  Cyprus  Iraq    Mozambique Spain 
Argentina Czech Republic Ireland Namibia Sri Lanka 
Armenia Denmark Israel  Nepal Sudan 
Australia            Djibouti   Italy Netherlands Swaziland  
Austria Dominican Republic Jamaica New Zealand          Sweden 
Azerbaijan, Rep. of Ecuador Japan   Nicaragua  Switzerland          
Bahrain, Kingdom of Egypt   Jordan Niger   Syrian Arab Republic 
Bangladesh El Salvador          Kazakhstan Nigeria Taiwan Prov.of China 
Belarus Equatorial Guinea    Kenya   Norway Tajikistan 
Belgium Estonia Korea, Republic of Oman    Tanzania   
Benin   Ethiopia   Kuwait Pakistan Thailand 
Bolivia Fiji    Kyrgyz Republic      Panama  Togo    
Bosnia & Herzegovina Finland Lao People's Dem.Rep Papua New Guinea     Trinidad and Tobago 
Botswana   France Latvia  Paraguay   Tunisia 
Brazil Gabon   Lebanon Peru Turkey 
Bulgaria   Georgia Lesotho Philippines Turkmenistan         
Burkina Faso         Germany Libya   Poland  Uganda  
Burundi Ghana   Lithuania  Portugal Ukraine 
Cambodia   Greece Macedonia, FYR Qatar United Arab Emirates 
Cameroon   Guatemala  Madagascar Romania United Kingdom       
Canada  Guinea  Malawi  Russian Federation United States 
Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau        Malaysia   Rwanda  Uruguay 
Central African Rep. Guyana  Mali    Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan 
Chad    Haiti   Mauritania Senegal Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Chile Honduras   Mauritius Sierra Leone         Vietnam 
China,P.R.: Mainland Hungary Mexico Singapore  Yemen, Republic of 
Colombia India Moldova Slovak Republic      Zambia 
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Table A3: Correlation analysis  
 
 FC GDP GE PD TAX 
FC 1     
GDP 0.25823237979 1    
GE 0.89530503541 0.29655180742 1   
PD 0.59016373889 0.53725908999 0.56156040816 1  
TAX 0.07520797802 0.00104191103 0.07096433014 0.02193290756 1 
 
 
Table A4: OLS estimates  
 
 Panel data Models: Dependent variable - Tax; standard error in parenthesis 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
TAX(-1) 
0.503539a 
(0.013546) 
0.503475a 
(0.013549) 
0.503356a 
(0.013559) 
FC 
0.002096 
(0.001407) 
0.002060 
(0.001409) 
0.002076 
(0.001410) 
GDP 
-1.84E-09 
(1.26E-08) 
3.66E-09 
(1.51E-08) 
3.50E-12 
(1.91E-08) 
GE 
-0.015356 
(0.032915) 
-0.017430 
(0.033068) 
-0.016844 
(0.033131) 
PS 
-4.96E-05 
(0.000596) 
0.000648 
(0.001205) 
0.001250 
(0.002270) 
PS*PS 
---- 
-5.61E-06 
(8.43E-06) 
-1.75E-05 
(3.89E-05) 
PS*PS*PS 
---- ---- 
5.32E-08 
(1.70E-07) 
C 
0.065789 
(0.055333) 
0.056457 
(0.057091) 
0.051721 
(0.059079) 
R-squared 0.492671 0.492826 0.492861 
Adjusted R-squared 0.490922 0.490726 0.490409 
S.E. of regression 0.520858 0.520958 0.521120 
Sum squared resid 393.3752 393.2549 393.2283 
Log likelihood -1113.252 -1113.030 -1112.980 
F-statistic 281.6213 234.6682 201.0330 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Akaike info criterion 1.537435 1.538502 1.539808 
Schwarz criterion 1.559207 1.563903 1.568838 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.545558 1.547979 1.550639 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.673429 2.674161 2.674083 
Note:
 a
 and 
b
 denote significance at 1 and 5 % level of significance.   
Source: Authors’ calculation  
 
 
